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The Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case:1 Is the 
meaning ascribed to the phrase “in the production of 
the income” by Watermeyer AJP in the Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway case still religiously followed today?
G.K. Goldswain & O. Swart
“Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis.”2 
4A B S T R A C T
9This article analyses the meaning attributed to the phrase “in the 
production of the income” as used in the present section 11(a) of the 
Income Tax Act, which provides for general expenses to be allowed as 
deductions against income. Read together with section 23(g), section 
11(a) is commonly referred to as the “general deduction formula”. It has 
been said that the meaning ascribed to the phrase by Watermeyer AJP 
(as he was then) in his judgment in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Company Ltd v CIR is “too mechanical and contrived”. Consequently, the 
judiciary, in applying the meaning as attributed to it by Watermeyer AJP 
in subsequent cases, has sometimes led to inconsistent and confl icting 
judgments. In fact, the application of the meaning so ascribed takes no 
account of the economic and other non-economic realities of doing 
business in the 21st century. The main objective of this article has been 
to re-ignite the debate surrounding Watermeyer AJP’s interpretation 
of the phrase, “in the production of the income”, in the Port Electric 
Tramway case and in so doing establish whether the narrow meaning 
ascribed by him to that phrase has subtly been changed and widened 
by the judiciary in subsequent cases. It can be concluded from an 
analysis of the case law discussed in this article that Watermeyer AJP’s 
interpretation, if strictly adhered to, can and does lead to absurd results. 
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1 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Ltd v CIR, 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 13.
2 Anonymous old Latin adage meaning “Times change and we change with them.”
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However, it is submitted that sanity has fi nally prevailed. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal in the comparatively recently decided cases of C:SARS 
v Mobile Telephone Networks Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Warner Lambert SA 
(Pty) Ltd v C:SARS, have considerably widened the ambit of expenses that 
may now be claimed in terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
The deduction of expenditure as was allowed in those two cases by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, would appear not to have been permissible in 
terms of Watermayer AJP’s interpretation of the meaning of the phrase 
“in the production of income”. It is submitted that the economic realities 
of doing business in South Africa in the 21st century are now taken 
into account in determining whether a business expense falls within the 
ambit of the phrase “incurred in the production of the income”.
10Key words:  Section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act, “in the production of the income”, “close 
connection”, “necessary concomitant”, “ordinary operations”, “remoteness”, 
negligence
1Early on a rainy morning on 20 July 1932, Piet Jacobs woke up for work. He was 
employed as a tram driver for the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Limited 
– a company that carried on the business of transporting fare-paying passengers in 
and around Port Elizabeth. That morning, Piet was the driver of a tramcar on the 
Russell Road route to the city centre but just after 6 o’clock that morning, with only a 
few passengers on board, Piet lost control of the tramcar while descending the steep 
Russell Road hill. The tramcar, after a harrowing trip down the hill, finally derailed 
at the bottom of the hill and ploughed into the Masonic Hotel and the jewellery 
business next door. It must have been a terrifying experience for those passengers on 
board. Fortunately, it appeared as if no one was seriously injured in the accident.3
2Little did Piet know that his claim for damages under the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act4 against his employer as a result of the tramcar accident would ultimately become 
one of the leading cases in income tax matters in South Africa on the interpretation 
of the phrase “in the production of the income” as used in section 11(2)(a) of the 1925 
Income Tax Act.5 This exact same phrase is still used in section 11(a) of the presently 
in force Income Tax Act6 (“Income Tax Act”).
3 Eastern Province Herald. 1932. Runaway Tram Dashes into Main Street Shop. 21 July. Port Elizabeth: Cape of Good 
Hope at 5.
4 No. 59 of 1934. Today referred to as the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, No. 130 of 1993, 
as amended by Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Amendment Act, No. 61 of 1997.
5 No. 40 of 1925.
6 No. 58 of 1962.
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3When the Commissioner for Inland Revenue (“Commissioner”) disallowed 
as a deduction both the compensation paid to the widow of Piet Jacobs (Piet had 
unfortunately passed away before the compensation claim was finally settled in 
court) as a result of the accident and the ensuing legal fees incurred in resisting the 
compensation claim, the directors of the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company 
Limited appealed to the then Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court against 
the decision after also having lost its stated case in the Special Court for Hearing 
Income Tax Appeals (“Special Court”). The decision by the Cape Provincial Division 
of the Supreme Court was reported in 1936 as Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Company Ltd v CIR.7
4Although the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway’s case never went on appeal to 
the then Appellate Division, the general meaning ascribed to the phrase “in the 
production of the income” in that case by Watermeyer AJP is still referred to today 
by certain academics as correctly stating its meaning.8 Contrary to this view is the 
opinion of Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P and Davey, T9 that the South African law 
relating to the deduction of expenditure incurred by a taxpayer who is conducting a 
trade has never really recovered from the test laid down by Watermeyer AJP. Kruger, 
et al10 regard the test as “too mechanical and contrived”. Instead they postulate that 
the possibly wider meaning ascribed to the phrase by Mason J in Lockie Bros Ltd 
v CIR,11 a decision given some 12 years prior the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
case, namely, that the expenditure must be actually incurred “in the course of and 
by reason of the ordinary operations undertaken for the purpose of conducting the 
business”,12 is a far more practical interpretation and should rather be used.
5It is submitted, for the reasons advanced later on in this article, that perhaps 
even the Lockie Bros test, as advocated by Kruger, et al,13 is still not wide enough to 
take into account the economic and other non-economic realities of how business 
and trade is conducted in the 21st century. For example, is it possible under either 
interpretation to take into account the moral, common law and statutorily imposed 
restrictions, obligations and responsibilities of taxpayers to incur expenditure – or 
even to submit to the requirements of shareholders (in the case of companies), to 
 7 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 13.
 8 Williams, RC. 2009. Income Tax in South Africa, 3rd edition, Durban: LexisNexis at 444 and De Koker, A and Williams, 
RC. 2013. SILKE on South African Income Tax, Volume 1, service 49, Durban: LexisNexis, para 7.8.
 9 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
10 Supra.
11 Lockie Bros Ltd v CIR, 1922 TPD 42, 32 SATC 150.
12 Supra at 152.
13 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
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other stakeholders (employees, creditors, debtors, customers) and to all the organs 
of state, to incur expenditure – and still be able to claim such expenditure as a 
deduction taking into account Watermeyer AJP’s interpretation of the phrase “in the 
production of the income”?
6Unfortunately, there has been little debate in this area for a considerable period 
of time because it has been assumed, erroneously, it is submitted, that the matter has 
long since been settled and needs no further debate. The reality, however, is that the 
manner in which business and trade is now conducted has changed considerably 
since the 1930s when the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case was decided.
7Thus, this article will endeavour to reignite the debate in this area and attempt to 
answer the question of whether either Watermeyer AJP’s or Mason J’s interpretation 
of the phrase “in the production of the income” should prevail or even if both their 
interpretations should be discarded and reinterpreted in the light of two comparatively 
recently decided Supreme Court of Appeal cases, namely, C:SARS v Mobile Telephone 
Networks Holdings (Pty) Ltd14 and Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS.15 It is 
submitted these two judgements, prima facie, appear to have considerably widened 
the ambit of expenses that may now be deducted as being incurred “in the production 
of the income” by taking into account the manner in which business was conducted 
in the latter part of the 20th century against, inter alia, the social background of 
apartheid and how it is now conducted in the 21st century. The conclusion reached 
as to whether Watermeyer AJP’s interpretation of the phrase “in the production of 
income” is still a valid interpretation for the 21st century, and if not valid, what is 
the interpretation that should be used, is the main contribution that this article will 
make to the body of knowledge in the field of taxation.
8In line with one of the overall objectives of this Special Edition of Tax Stories, 
namely, to make a pedagogical contribution to the teaching and learning of tax 
principles by telling the story behind the story, it is considered appropriate to place 
the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case in its historical and social context. It is 
hoped that telling the story behind the story will contribute to and enable a more 
accessible and interesting journey of discovery for the tax scholar.
14 [2014] ZASCA 4.
15 2003(5) SA 344 (SCA), 65 SATC 346.
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The story behind the story
1The Port Elizabeth Tramway Company Limited was founded in 1879 as a subsidiary 
of the Cape Town Tramway company.16 Two years later, on 14 May 1881,17 the Port 
Elizabeth network of transporting passengers by tram commenced. Initially the 
tram network operated with five horse-drawn tramcars that were imported from 
America. In 1895 the Cape Parliament passed an Act allowing the Port Elizabeth 
municipality to construct an electric tram system to replace the horse-drawn tram 
carriages. Ten electric trams were ordered from Philadelphia, America. The first 
electric tram in Port Elizabeth was driven on 16 June 1897 from the Market Square 
to Prince Alfred’s Park where the Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium is now located.
2Shortly after the introduction of the electric tram system, a double-decker tram 
was successfully tested both up and down the steep hill of the Russell Road route. The 
new route was opened to the public on 20 July 1897.18 The switch to electric tramcars 
had a positive influence on the economy of Port Elizabeth since it allowed the labour 
force from outlying suburban areas like Walmer, to travel quickly and cheaply to 
work. However, there was also a price to be paid. By 1932 there had already been 
two accidents of runaway trams on the Russell Road route. Fortunately, Piet Jacobs’ 
accident in 1932 was the last major accident reported on this route until the tram 
routes were closed in 1948.
3Two judges were involved in deciding the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, 
namely, Watermeyer AJP and Davis J. Ernest Frederick Watermeyer,19 who over a 
period of nearly 30 years, handed down many important tax judgments.20 In several 
of these cases Davis J presided on the bench with him.21 Watermeyer AJP’s decision in 
the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, together with his seemingly contradictory 
decision in the Joffe22 case, decided some ten years later, provided what was to become 
recognised as legal precedent in respect of the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase 
16 Heritage. 2013. Electricity in South Africa. Overhead trolley-wire electric trams. [Online] Available at: http://heritage.
eskom.co.za/heritage/electricity_in_south_africa.htm. [Accessed: 24 January 2013].
17 Wikipedia. 2013. Trams in Port Elizabeth. [Online] Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trams_in_Port_Elizabeth 
Wikipedia. [Accessed: 24 January 2013].
18 Harradine, M. 1997. Port Elizabeth: A Social Chronicle to the End of 1945. [Online] Available at: http://bygonesandby-
ways.blogspot.com.au/search/label/Trams [Accessed: 19 August 2013].
19 Refer to Stack, EM, Grenville, D, Poole, R, Horn, E & Harnett, H. 2014. “Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever 
Brothers and Unilever Ltd: a practical problem of source” (in this edition of the journal) for a more detailed discussion 
on Judge Ernest Frederick Watermeyer.
20 Inter alia, some of the well-known cases he decided: Lategan v CIR, 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16; Ochberg v CIR, 1933 
CPD 256, 6 SATC 1; Pyott Ltd v CIR, 1945 AD 128, 13 SATC 121; Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1946 AD 157, 13 SATC 354; 
New State Areas Ltd v CIR, 1946 AD 610, 14 SATC 155 and CIR v Lever Bros & Unilever Ltd, 1946 AD 441, 14 SATC 1.
21 Watermeyer became Chief Justice (CJ) of the Appellate Division in 1943 while Davis was later also to become a Judge 
of Appeal in the Appellate Division. 
22 Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1946 AD 157, 13 SATC 354.
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“in the production of the income”. Thus, it is considered appropriate to discuss in the 
next paragraph, the facts, the decision, the ratio decidendi (reasons for the decision) 
and the obiter dicta (explanations and discussion on a point of law not necessary for 
the decision – in effect an aside by the judge) of the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
case before comparing the decision in that case to the decision in the Joffe case and 
other relevant cases that dealt with the interpretation and thus the meaning to be 
ascribed to the phrase “in the production of the income”.
The facts, decision, ratio decidendi and obiter dicta of the 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case
1After the accident occurred on 20 July 1932, it was reported in the local newspaper 
the next day that only the tramcar driver and a passenger, Mr S Greyling, a post 
office official, were admitted to hospital reportedly with non-life threatening minor 
injuries. This was a lucky escape because the tramcar was so badly damaged that it 
had to be completely demolished to enable it to be removed.23
2From a historical perspective, it is interesting to note that both Kruger, et al24 and 
Williams25 state that the driver lost control of the tram while descending the Russell 
Road hill and was killed in the ensuing accident. However, this statement clearly 
conflicts with the newspaper report. Perhaps the correct version is that, as stated in 
the court record, the tramcar driver suffered injuries from the accident from which 
he subsequently died.
3In any event, as a result of the accident and the ensuing legal claim for compensation, 
the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Limited was ordered by the court, 
in terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to pay compensation amounting to 
£664 to Piet Jacobs’ widow as well as the attendant legal fees of £748 in resisting the 
claim for compensation. Both these expenses were claimed by the taxpayer in terms 
of section 11(2)(a) read together with section 13(b) of the 1925 Income Tax Act,26 
which read as follows:
Section 11(2) – The deductions allowed shall be
(a)  expenditure and losses actually incurred in the Union in the production of the income, 
provided such expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature…
23 Eastern Province Herald. 1932. Runaway Tram Dashes into Main Street Shop. 21 July. Port Elizabeth: Cape of Good 
Hope at 5.
24 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 251.
25 Williams, RC. 2009. Income Tax in South Africa, 3rd edition, Durban: LexisNexis at 444.
26 No. 40 of 1925.
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Section 13 – No deduction shall, as regards income derived from any trade, be made in respect 
of any of the following matters
(b) any moneys not wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade.
1These sections are easily recognised because they later became embodied in sections 
11(a) and 23(g) of the present Income Tax Act. The section 23(g) phrase “wholly 
and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade” has, however, now 
been amended to read “to the extent laid out or expended for the purposes of trade”. 
The amendment has opened the door to the apportionment of expenses between 
those lump-sum expenses that are incurred for a dual purpose, namely, expenses 
that are incurred “in the production of the income” and “laid out for the purposes of 
trade”, and those expenses that are not so incurred, for example, private or domestic 
expenditure. However, any further discussion on section 23(g) of the Income Tax 
Act is considered to be beyond the scope of this article.
2As already indicated, the Commissioner disallowed both the compensation 
paid and attendant legal expenses claimed by the taxpayer as not being incurred 
“in the production of the income”. As a result, the taxpayer immediately appealed 
the decision to the Special Court. The appeal was dismissed in that court and the 
next step in the appeal process was to approach the Cape Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court, which the taxpayer did.
3During the course of his judgment in the Cape Provincial Division, Watermeyer 
AJP specifically remarked on the obscure and ambiguous nature of the language 
used in the phrase “in the production of the income”. In his opinion, expenditure 
or losses could not directly produce income. Rather, income is produced by a series 
of operations and transactions entered into for the purpose of manufacturing or 
acquiring a saleable product and thereafter selling it or rendering services for which 
payment is received.27
4Watermeyer AJP then dealt with the three qualifications necessary before 
expenditure can become deductible, namely:28
• the expenditure must be actually incurred,
• it must not be of a capital nature, and
• it must be incurred in the production of the income.
1It is important to note that the Income Tax Act (both past and present legislation) 
uses the words “actually incurred” and not “necessarily incurred” when prescribing 
27 8 SATC 13 at 14.
28 Supra at 15.
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the prerequisite for the deduction of the expenditure. Using the qualification 
“necessarily incurred” would certainly have narrowed the type of expenditure that 
can be claimed. Thus, Watermeyer AJP held that even if a taxpayer conducts his 
business inefficiently or extravagantly, that is no ground in itself for disallowing 
such expenditure. Thus, for example, a taxpayer may fly overseas on business. The 
cost of the air ticket, irrespective of whether the taxpayer flies economy class or 
first class, is deductible. The deductible amount is not restricted to the cost of an 
economy class air ticket, which would have been the position had the deduction of 
expenditure been restricted only to expenditure necessarily incurred.
2Furthermore, Watermeyer AJP stated that expenses “actually incurred” cannot 
mean “actually paid” because, for as long as there is a liability to pay, the expense 
is actually incurred and may therefore be deductible.29 He, therefore, found that the 
payment of compensation to the driver was expenditure “actually incurred”.30
3The expenditure, to be deductible, must also not be of a capital nature. This 
requirement was, however, neither argued nor even discussed in any detail in the 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case. Watermeyer AJP accepted, relying on the 
judgement of Innes CJ in George Forest and Timber Company Limited v CIR,31 that 
the expenditure was not capital expenditure incurred “for the purpose of acquiring 
some income producing concern”.
4The third requirement for expenditure to qualify as a deduction is that the 
expenditure must be actually incurred “in the production of the income”. To 
determine the nature of the expenditure that may be deductible, Watermeyer AJP 
used two tests, namely:32
• to determine whether the act to which the expenditure was related, was to produce 
income, and
• was the expenditure linked closely enough to the act?
1These tests are referred to by Williams33 as the “subjective purpose test” and the 
“objective nexus test”. The objective test is also referred to as the “closely connected” 
test or, as later described in Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR,34 as the “inevitable 
concomitant” test.35
29 Supra at 15. Also refer to ITC 1553, (1989) 55 SATC 105 at 111.
30 Supra at 16.
31 1924 AD 527, 1 SATC 20.
32 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Ltd v CIR, 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 13.
33 Williams, RC. 2009. Income Tax in South Africa, 3rd edition, Durban: LexisNexis at 446.
34 Also decided by Watermeyer CJ (as he later became).
35 13 SATC 354 at 359.
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2In the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, Watermeyer AJP, using the two tests, 
attempted to set the limits or ambit for the interpretation and thus the meaning to 
be ascribed to the phrase “in the production of the income”. It is submitted, however, 
that the words used in the judgment to describe its meaning, especially taking into 
account the facts in the case and the obiter dicta36 made by him during the course of 
his judgment – to be discussed in detail below – were somewhat vague, confusing 
and even impractical, and inevitably set the scene for contradictory and even absurd 
judgments that followed, as was suggested by Kruger, et al.37
3Watermeyer AJP logically pointed out that the employment of drivers was 
necessary for the carrying on of the transport business of the taxpayer, for without 
passengers, no income could be earned. The employment of drivers carried with it, 
as a necessary consequence,38 a potential liability to pay compensation in terms of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act if there were to be an accident and a driver injured. 
Thus, in his opinion, the payment made by the taxpayer as compensation had to be 
regarded as part of the cost of its operations and thus incurred “in the production of 
the income”. After all, there was irrefutable evidence that there had previously been 
two such similar tram accidents on the Russell Road route.
4The question that may be posed at this point is why, if the taxpayer correctly 
won the argument on the compensation claim, Watermeyer AJP has been criticised 
by Kruger, et al39 for being too “mechanical and contrived” in his interpretation of 
the phrase “in the production of the income”.40 It is submitted that this criticism can 
be attributed to two reasons, namely, certain obiter dicta made by Watermeyer AJP 
during the course of his judgement, which may incorrectly have been interpreted 
as being part of the ratio decidendi, as well as the decision of Watermeyer AJP to 
disallow the claim for legal expenses. His reasoning was that the legal expenses were 
incurred in resisting a demand for compensation and thus were not incurred “in 
the production of the income” in that the incurral of a legal expense was “not an 
operation entered upon for the purpose of earning income”.41
5It is submitted that Watermeyer AJP erred in disallowing the legal expenses 
incurred by the taxpayer. After all, the legal expenses were only incurred because of 
36 Pronouncements not necessary for the judgement.
37 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
38 Supra at 18
39 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis.
40 Supra at 152.
41 Further discussion on the disallowance of the legal expenses is considered to be beyond the scope of this article as 
the legislature recognised the unfairness of disallowing legal expenses in the circumstances that prevailed in the Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramway’s case and later in Joffe’s case (the events for judgement relating to the Joffe case took 
place in 1938 and 1939) by promulgating legislation in 1941 to permit the deduction of legal expenses incurred in 
the ordinary course of, or by reason of the ordinary operations of the taxpayer.
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the claim against the taxpayer for compensation, the claim of which the taxpayer was 
entitled to and properly did resist. There was no other purpose for the expenditure. 
The legal expenses incurred were an essential and integral part of the compensation 
claim. Thus, logic dictates that it should follow that if the compensation paid 
should be regarded as being closely connected to the operations of the taxpayer in 
transporting taxpayers for reward, then the attendant legal expenses incurred that 
are incurred solely in connection with resisting the compensation claim should also 
meet the “closely connected” test.
6The disallowance of the legal expenses, in effect, meant that tax was being levied 
on the legal expenses that were incurred with the sole purpose of protecting its bottom 
line profits. This part of the judgement, it is submitted, apart from being illogical and 
absurd, was unfair to the taxpayer and became indefensible with the legislature being 
forced to remedy the situation by later introducing legislation to permit the deduction 
of legal expenses that statutorily negated Watermeyer AJP’s judgment in this respect. 
Section 11(c) of the Income Tax Act now specifically caters for the deduction of legal 
expenses.
7The wording in section 11(c) is very interesting. It steers clear of the phrase 
“in the production of the income” and instead uses virtually the same words that 
Mason J used in the Lockie Bros42 case to interpret and ascribe a meaning to that 
phrase, namely, that the phrase must be given the meaning that the expenditure 
must be “actually incurred in the course of and by reason of the ordinary operations 
undertaken for the purpose of conducting the business”.43 If section 11(c) had been 
in operation at the time of the decision given in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
case, or if Watermeyer AJP had followed the interpretation ascribed to the phrase 
by a fellow judge (Mason J) in an earlier decision, albeit from a different division 
of the then Supreme Court, it is submitted that the legal expenses would have been 
deductible. It is further submitted with a word of caution that the meaning attributed 
to the phrase “in the production of the income” by Mason J in the Lockie Bros case, 
prima facie, may appear to have a wider ambit than the meaning ascribed to it by 
Watermeyer AJP. However, as will be seen from the discussion later on in this article, 
the decision of Mason J, if the facts of the case are closely analysed, indicates that 
the ambit of the meaning that he attributed to the phrase, although appearing to be 
considerably wider than Watermeyer AJP’s interpretation, is not as wide a meaning 
as commentators such as Kruger et al44 contend.
42 1922 TPD 42, 32 SATC 150.
43 32 SATC 150 at 152.
44 Supra.
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8During the course of his judgment in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, it 
appears as if Watermeyer AJP went beyond what was required to decide the matter 
at hand. He indicated, as obiter dicta, that for an expense to be deductible, the act 
must be bona fide done for the purpose of carrying on an income-producing trade. 
Thus, in his opinion, unlawful or negligent acts are not bona fide and the related 
expenditure that arises from such acts would probably not qualify as a legitimate 
deductible expense.45 His opinion in this regard is indicative of how strict and narrow 
an interpretation he attempted to place on the phrase “in the production of the 
income”. Negligence was not even an issue in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
case as the compensation was paid under a claim brought in terms of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act. The claim was not a delictual action for compensation caused by 
negligence, but a statutory liability in terms of the claim arising from an employer-
employee relationship. Thus, whether or not negligence played a part in the accident 
was irrelevant to the decision and it was not necessary for Watermeyer AJP to discuss 
the deductibility or otherwise of expenditure incurred as a result of negligence.
9Unfortunately, his obiter dicta put him in an unenviable position ten years later 
when he was required to give judgment in the Joffe46 case where negligence was 
actually found to be present. Thus, it is considered relevant to discuss, in the following 
paragraph, Watermeyer CJ’s judgment in the Joffe case as well as the decisions given 
by judges in other cases where there were issues of negligence.
Other related negligence cases
1In 1946, Watermeyer, who had by then been appointed Chief Justice of South Africa, 
had a chance to further articulate his views on the meaning to be ascribed to the 
phrase “in the production of the income” and the potential effect that negligence on 
the part of the taxpayer has on the deductibility of compensation paid. He presided 
in the Joffe47 case where the taxpayer carried on business as engineers in reinforced 
concrete. A concrete cantilever hood48 for a power station in Durban, the building 
of which the taxpayer was supervising, collapsed and a plumber employed by 
another contractor was killed by the falling material. It was later established that 
45 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company Ltd v CIR, 8 SATC 13 at 17.
46 Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1946 AD 157, 13 SATC 354.
47 Supra
48 Cantilevers are important structures in the design of bridges, cranes and even power stations. A cantilever is defi ned 
as a “beam, girder or structural framework that is fi xed at one end and is free at the other”. The free dictionary. 2013. 
Cantilever. [Online] Available at: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ [Accessed: 4 September 2013].
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the reinforcing steel rods had become displaced from their proper position while 
the concrete was being poured. This displacement had weakened the structure and 
caused it to collapse. In a delictual court action brought against the taxpayer, it was 
established that the taxpayer had been negligent in supervising the construction 
work and, accordingly, it was required to pay compensation to the relatives of 
the deceased workman. The compensation and legal expenses directly related to 
resisting the compensation action were claimed as a deduction incurred “in the 
production of the income”. The Commissioner disallowed both the compensation 
awarded and the attendant legal expenses incurred in resisting and defending the 
claim as a deduction.
2The facts in the Joffe case, prima facie, appear to be very similar to the facts in the 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, negligence notwithstanding. The economic 
consequences to the taxpayer were the same as for the taxpayer in the Port Elizabeth 
Tramway case. In both cases compensation had to be paid as a result of an accident 
occurring while carrying on a business. So a similar result could have been expected. 
But that was not to be. Watermeyer CJ not only disallowed the legal expenses claimed 
– to be expected since he had made the same decision on this very point in the 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway’s case – but also the compensation paid. He held 
that the taxpayer failed to prove49 that the negligent construction was a “necessary 
concomitant” of, and was “closely linked” to the trading operations of a reinforced 
concrete engineer.
3If one reads this judgement closely, it is clear that, far from excluding all acts 
of negligence as automatically prohibiting the expenditure incurred from being 
deducted, the judgment in the Joffe case was, in effect, contrary to Watermeyer AJP’s 
own obiter dicta in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case in regard to negligence. 
It therefore follows that the deduction of expenditure resulting from negligence may 
be claimed, provided that the taxpayer can discharge the onus of proof placed upon 
him, as is now required under section 102 of the Tax Administration Act.50 Placing 
as evidence before a court, for example, valid statistics of the number of workmen 
who have been killed on building sites over a period of 20 years due to negligence, 
could go a long way towards discharging the onus of proof provisions by showing that 
negligent acts by employees is an occurrence that is expected and that even if strict 
precautionary measures are undertaken to prevent such accidents happening, it is 
still an inherent risk of doing business in the construction industry.
49 The onus of proof provisions that were included in section 57 of the Income Tax Act (No. 40 of 1925) and later in 
section 82 of the Income Tax Act (No. 58 of 1962) are now embodied in section 102 of the Tax Administration Act 
(No. 28 of 2011).
50 No. 28 of 2011. The onus provisions were previously contained in section 82 of the Income Tax Act.
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4Support for the view that where negligence is involved there should be no automatic 
disallowance of the compensation paid as a result thereof, had already been given in 
1922 in the Lockie Bros,51 case when Mason J, in dealing with negligence, said the 
following:52
“The handling of the goods is a necessary incident of the business and negligence in that re-
spect does not alter the nature of the transaction.” 
1Further support for the deduction of expenditure resulting from negligence was 
given in ITC 23353 where a taxpayer carried on the business of a stevedore. A passer-
by was killed when an article fell out of a net while the taxpayer was unloading 
cargo from a vessel during the course of carrying on its business. The taxpayer had 
been negligent in securing the cargo in the net. The court held that the resultant 
payment for damages had to be regarded as incidental to a stevedoring business and 
was therefore deductible.
2ITC 81554– decided some ten years after the Joffe judgment – also lends support 
for the submission that the Joffe judgment is not precedent for the principle that 
all expenditure, including claims for damages arising as a result of negligence by a 
taxpayer, is not deductible as not being “in the production of the income”. In that case, 
the taxpayer – a partner in a firm of attorneys – sought to deduct his proportionate 
share of a loss incurred by the partnership for trust moneys held for investment that 
had been embezzled by employees of the partnership. The Commissioner refused to 
allow the deduction. On appeal, Roper J, in regard to negligence, had the following 
to say:55
“An examination of Joffe’s case will show that it does not decide that losses incurred through 
the negligence of the taxpayer are not deductible from the taxpayer’s income. It turned on the 
point that there was no evidence (author’s emphasis) that losses arising from the negligence of 
the particular taxpayer were necessary concomitants of the business which he carried on.” 
1In spite of all these judgements favouring and supporting the deductibility of 
compensation paid as a result of negligence, the judge in ITC 1058,56 it is submitted, 
took a backward step and erred when holding that the compensation paid as a 
result of a negligent or perhaps only a stupid act on the part of the taxpayer, was 
51 1922 TPD 42, 32 SATC 150.
52 Supra at 152.
53 (1932) 6 SATC 259.
54 (1955) 20 SATC 487 (T).
55 Supra at 488 and 489.
56 (1963) 26 SATC 305.
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not deductible. The South African Railways had parked a trailer in front of the 
entrance to the taxpayer’s factory. The employees of the taxpayer, unfortunately 
for some reason not mentioned in the case, partially moved the trailer onto a tarred 
portion of the road. During the night, a motorist crashed into the trailer and both 
the taxpayer and the Railways had to pay damages to the motorist as a result of the 
accident.57 The court reasoned, somewhat absurdly it is submitted, that a third party 
who happens to drive past the factory at night is not essential to the taxpayer’s trade 
and did not, therefore, produce income.
2From an analysis of the above cases, it may be concluded that even expenditure 
that has some form of negligence attached to it, may be deductible as being incurred 
“in the production of the income” provided the taxpayer can discharge the onus of 
proof placed upon him. Neither the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway nor the Joffe 
cases created a precedent that automatically disallows expenditure claimed as a 
deduction arising as a result of negligence.
3Both the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway and Joffe cases dealt with compensation 
and damages paid and the related legal fees. However, the apparent narrow 
interpretation of the phrase “in the production of the income” by Watermeyer in both 
these decisions was later used as a basis or guide for determining the deductibility 
for all types of general business expenditure and losses. The question that arises 
in this respect is whether the judiciary slavishly followed the narrow interpretation 
of Watermeyer AJP in subsequent cases that did not deal with compensation and 
damages claims, or whether it merely paid lip service to the interpretation and 
surreptitiously widened its ambit by taking into account the moral, common law 
and other statutory legislation costs as well as the economic realities that the modern 
business has to face in the 21st century. In the next paragraph, the deductibility of 
expenditure incurred by a taxpayer as a result of statutory and other stakeholder 
requirements will be discussed.
Interpretation of the phrase “in the production of the income” 
where the expenditure incurred is not related to damages and 
compensation paid
1The narrow meaning attributed to the phrase “in the production of the income” 
by Watermeyer in both the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway and the Joffe cases, was 
followed in subsequent cases where the expenditure incurred was not related to 
57 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
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damages and compensation paid. It is submitted that there is clear evidence from 
the discussion that follows in this paragraph that by slavishly following Watermeyer 
AJP’s narrow interpretation, some rather absurd decisions were given. Furthermore, 
by 2003 the judiciary, unlike SARS, appeared to have recognised the absurdity of 
some of its previous decisions and had subtly begun to widen the ambit of the phrase 
to take into account the economic, social, statutory and even the requirements of its 
shareholders and other stakeholders that have emerged over the past 40 years or so.
Interest incurred as a result of the conversion of a dividend declared to a 
shareholder’s loan account
1C:SARS v Scribante Construction (Pty) Ltd58 is a useful guide as to the judicial 
meaning of the phrase “in the production of the income” in a situation when a 
dividend declared to a shareholder is converted to a loan account on which interest 
is payable. Half of the dividend declared by the company was credited to the 
shareholder’s account as an interest-bearing loan. The other half was credited to 
the same account as an interest free loan. On appeal against the Commissioner’s 
decision not to allow the deduction for the interest incurred on the interest bearing 
portion of the loan account, the court held that the purpose of the loan to the 
company by its shareholders was to further enhance the already healthy position of 
the taxpayer. In addition, the company’s financial profile improved. This enabled 
it to obtain future business and earn interest for the taxpayer. The loan in issue 
had, therefore, produced income to the advantage of the company and the interest 
incurred was held to be “in the production of the income” and thus deductible in 
the determination of its taxable income.
2The circumstances in the Scribante case must be distinguished from the situation 
when a taxpayer borrows money to pay a dividend to its shareholders. The interest 
incurred on such a loan is not an expense “in the production of the income”,59 as 
dividends do not constitute “income” as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
In addition, the circumstances must also be distinguished from the situation where 
the taxpayer borrows money to buy shares in a company as was the case in CIR v 
Shapiro.60 In the Shapiro case, the court did not allow the interest incurred on the 
loan used to purchase the shares as a deduction as the dividends received do not 
produce income as defined.
58 2001(2) SA 601 (E), 62 SATC 443.
59 Also refer to Ticktin Timbers CC v CIR, [1999] 4 All SA 192 (A), 61 SATC 399.
60 1928 NLR 436, 4 SATC 29.
The Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case
G.K. Goldswain & O. Swart
86
3Although the circumstances in the Scribante case were completely different to 
those in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, Watermeyer AJP’s interpretation 
of the phrase “in the production of the income” may possibly have been wide enough 
to cover the deduction of interest paid to shareholders on dividends that could have 
been paid in cash but are converted to shareholders’ loan accounts. In any event, the 
Scribante judgement has, it is submitted, been part of the clarification process as to 
how the judiciary interpret the phrase “in the production of the income” for general 
business expenditure other than for damages and compensation.
Insurance premiums
1In Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR61 the taxpayer company carried on the business of mining 
for gold. It made a practice of taking out policies of insurance against losses incurred 
by fire in respect of net profits and standing charges. The insurance against the 
loss of net profits was undertaken in order to enable the company to maintain a 
steady rate of dividends to be paid to its shareholders, notwithstanding a cessation 
of its operations in part or in whole by reason of fire. The insurance in respect of 
the standing charges was designed to enable the company to carry on its essential 
services without loss. These insurance premiums were claimed as a deduction by 
the taxpayer although no insurance claims were made during that year. It was held 
that section 11(a) does not require that claimable expenditure must have produced 
income in the same year it was incurred. Therefore in the view of Centlivres JA, it 
was irrelevant that no income was received and he allowed the expenditure as its 
purpose was to produce income in the case of a fire. This decision, it is submitted, 
also clarified and widened the meaning of the phrase “in the production of the 
income” as originally postulated by Watermeyer AJP.
Expenditure incurred at the behest of its holding company
1In Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS,62 the taxpayer, an American-owned 
company operating in South Africa during the apartheid regime, was a voluntary 
signatory to the Sullivan Code.63 During the height of apartheid, an Act was 
61 1948 (4) SA 580 (A), 15 SATC 381.
62 2003 (5) SA 344 (SCA), 65 SATC 346.
63 The Reverend Sullivan, an American citizen, was a critical activist against the former South African apartheid govern-
ment. The Sullivan Code principles provided for the non-segregation of races in the workplace, equal and fair employ-
ment for all employees, equal pay, development of training programmes, increasing the number of disadvantaged 
persons in management and supervisory positions and improving the quality of employees’ lives outside the work 
environment (Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS, 2003(5) SA 344 (SCA), 65 SATC 346 at 346 and 348).
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promulgated in America to force American companies and its subsidiaries operating 
in South Africa to comply with the Sullivan Code principles. If not complied with, 
fines and even the imprisonment of the directors of the participating American 
companies could be imposed.64 The South African subsidiary company claimed the 
social responsibility expenses that it was forced to incur to comply with the Sullivan 
Code principles, as deductions in the determination of its income. These expenses 
were disallowed by the Commissioner on the basis that the expense had not been 
incurred in the production of the taxpayer’s income. In effect, the expenses were 
incurred at the behest of the American holding company and therefore, could never 
actually produce income.
2On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, Conradie JA (the other four judges 
concurred with his judgment) found a link, which was not regarded as too remote, 
between the continued trade of the taxpayer and the expenditure at the behest of its 
holding company. It was held that the Sullivan Code expenses were bona fide incurred 
for the performance of the South African taxpayer’s income-producing operation, 
and formed part of the cost of performing it. If the company had not followed the 
dictates of its holding company, disagreeable consequences were a possibility which 
would almost certainly have translated to a loss of income. The social responsibility 
expenditure was therefore held to be incurred for the purposes of trade and in the 
production of its income. In addition, this expenditure reduced the risk that the 
taxpayer might lose its privileged subsidiary status, it benefitted the underprivileged 
and it pleased its American parent.65 See also Solarglass Finance Limited v CIR66 
where a similar decision was given in regard to loans made by a subsidiary company 
to other companies in the group at the behest of its holding company.
3Perhaps in interpreting the phrase “in the production of the income” a type of 
“remoteness” test to expand the meaning of the “close connection” test as used by 
Watermeyer AJP in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, was used by Conradie 
JA. In explaining the remoteness connection, he distinguished between the Sullivan 
Code expenditure that was admittedly deductible, such as salaries, and other Sullivan 
Code social responsibility expenditure where the deductibility of the expenditure was 
questionable, such as “working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, 
economic and political justice”.67 He made the following comments in this regard:68
64 Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS, 2003 (5) SA 344 (SCA), 65 SATC 346 at 349.
65 Supra at 352.
66 1991 (2) SA 257, 53 SATC 1
67 65 SATC 346 at 349.
68 Supra at 352.
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“It is true that the link between the appellant’s trade and the social responsibility expenditure is 
not as close and obvious in the second category as in the first, but that does not mean that the 
connection is too remote (author’s emphasis). To qualify as moneys expended in the course of 
trade, an outlay does not itself have to produce a profit.” 
1It is submitted that the use of the remoteness test is simply another way of establishing, 
analysing and confirming the closeness of the connection between the trade being 
carried on and the expenditure incurred. The remoteness test theoretically adheres 
to Watermeyer AJP’s interpretation of the phrase, but if one looks at the facts of the 
Warner Lambert case, it is submitted that the interpretation of the phrase in that case 
goes far beyond that which Watermeyer AJP ever intended. It is further submitted 
that such expenditure may not even have qualified under Mason J’s interpretation 
of the phrase in the Lockie Bros69 case as being “actually incurred in the course of 
and by reason of the ordinary operations undertaken for the purpose of conducting 
the business” if one reads these words together with the facts of that case. The Lockie 
Bros decision will be discussed in greater detail in this context later on in this article.
2The decision in the Warner Lambert case, it is submitted, was the first judgement 
of major importance to break down the barriers and restrictions that Watermeyer 
AJP in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway decision had placed before taxpayers in 
claiming general business expenditure incurred as a deduction. The decision, it is 
submitted, now potentially leaves the door open for taxpayers to claim a greater range 
of business expenses that may be deductible than was previously available or possible 
in terms of the Port Elizabeth Tramway and Joffe interpretation of the phrase “in the 
production of the income”.
Audit fees
1In the light of the rather narrow interpretation placed on the phrase “in the 
production of the income” in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway and Joffe cases, it 
is surprising that the Commissioner, in practice, permitted taxpayers to deduct audit 
fees without question. Where is the “close connection” between audit fees and the 
production of income? How can audit fees ever produce income, even indirectly? 
According to Watermeyer – the presiding judge in both the Port Electric Tramway 
and the Joffe cases – even legal fees that are directly related and attributable to the 
payment of deductible compensation may not qualify as being expenses incurred 
“in the production of the income”. Mason J’s possibly wider interpretation of the 
phrase in the Lockie Bros70 case may have permitted the deduction of audit fees. 
69 (1922) 32 SATC 150 at 152.
70 (1922) 32 SATC 150 at 152.
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An audit fee is statutorily imposed upon a company and thus, it is submitted, may 
be considered, like legal expenses incurred, as an expense incurred in the ordinary 
course of carrying on a trade.
2Amazingly, after close to a century of permitting the deduction of audit fees, 
the Commissioner appeared to have questioned its own practice of permitting such 
expenditure and the matter had to proceed to court to be resolved. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal in C:SARS v Mobile Telephone Networks Holdings (Pty) Ltd,71 held 
that the auditing of financial records was part of the taxpayer’s general overhead 
expenditure enabling it to carry out all of its activities and endorsed the court a 
quo’s conclusion that the audit fees were deductible as it is clearly a function that 
is “necessarily attached” to the performance of the income-earning operations of a 
company.72
3This decision, it is submitted, was the second judgement of major importance to 
break down the barriers and restrictions that Watermeyer AJP in the Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway decision had placed before taxpayers in claiming general business 
expenditure incurred as a deduction.
4Before finally concluding on the present day interpretation of the phrase “in the 
production of the income”, it seems appropriate to first examine the deductibility of 
losses arising as a result of theft by employees. After all, the Lockie Bros73 case dealt 
with this matter and the facts of this case provides insight into the interpretation that 
Mason J intended to place on the phrase “in the production of the income”.
Losses from theft or misappropriation by employees
1For the purposes of the general deduction formula, it has been held that there is 
no difference between expenditure and loss, one being a voluntary payment and 
the other an involuntary deprivation.74 Thus, losses suffered by a taxpayer as a 
result of theft and misappropriation of funds, and whether these losses have been 
incurred “in the production of the income” and therefore qualify as a deduction, 
have been examined in various cases over the years. Although Mason J in the Lockie 
Bros75 case is credited by Kruger, et al76 as giving a fairly wide interpretation to the 
meaning of the phrase “in the production of the income”, this interpretation was 
71 [2014] ZASCA 4.
72 C:SARS v Mobile Telephone Networks Holdings (Pty) Ltd, [2014] ZASCA 4 at par 11.
73 (1922) 32 SATC 150 at 152.
74 Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR, 1946 AD 157, 13 SATC 354.
75 1922 TPD 42, 32 SATC 150.
76 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
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not, surprisingly, in his opinion, wide enough to cover losses arising as a result of the 
embezzlement of funds by a senior manager (employee) of the taxpayer. He held 
that embezzlement by a senior manager was not an operation that was ordinarily 
undertaken for the purposes of the business and consequently, the loss was not 
deductible. It is submitted that based upon his judgement of the facts in this case, 
his interpretation, although couched in words that appear to covey a wider meaning 
to the phrase “in the production of the income” than that of Watermeyer AJP in the 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, his intended interpretation is in actual fact not 
much wider.
2It is clear that after the Lockie Bros77 case, the judiciary was confused as to the 
interpretation to be placed on the phrase “in the production of income” when it comes 
to the deductibility of losses arising from theft or embezzlement. In COT v Rendle,78 
a clerk in a firm of accountants misappropriated trust funds belonging to two clients 
as well as funds belonging to the firm. The court held that the misappropriation of 
the trust funds of the clients by the clerk, who was a subordinate,79 “was sufficiently 
closely connected to the firm’s business operations as to be regarded as part of the cost 
of performing those operations”. However, the misappropriation of the taxpayer’s 
own funds by the same clerk was not deductible as the taxpayer had not discharged 
the onus of proof that there was a sufficiently close connection to the firm’s business 
operations and the misappropriation. It is submitted that this is a further example of 
an absurd conclusion. No account was taken of the similar economic consequences 
suffered by the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s clients. They both suffered losses from 
the same act of misappropriation by the same employee, yet in the case of the 
misappropriation of the funds of the client, the losses were permitted as deductions 
while when the taxpayer’s own funds were misappropriated, the losses could not be 
claimed as a deduction.
3The later decision in ITC 122180 also dealt with the misappropriation of funds 
by a subordinate employee. The court confirmed that the Lockie Bros81 case was 
authority that theft by a managing director, a director or a manager in the position 
of a proprietor will not be deductible as theft is not a loss that can be regarded as 
connected with or arising out of trade. However, losses suffered as a result of “thefts 
77 (1922) 32 SATC 150.
78 1965(1) SA 59 (SRAD), 26 SATC 326.
79 (1963) 26 SATC 326 at 333–334.
80 (1974) 36 SATC 233.
81 (1922) 32 SATC 150.
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by subordinate employees may be regarded as losses, which are an incident of the 
taxpayer’s trading activities”.82 The same principle was also applied in ITC 1242.83
4It is submitted that a more reasoned approach that assists with the somewhat 
confusing issue of permitting a loss as a result of a misappropriation, theft or 
embezzlement by junior staff to be deductible, but prohibiting the same deduction 
when the misappropriation is by a senior staff member, is the judgment in ITC 1383.84 
The court held that there is no logical basis for restricting the deductibility to the 
petty thefts of junior employees, and further, that in the ordinary course of its 
business a commercial bank must necessarily allow its employees to handle large 
sums of money. The risk of theft is then inherent in and an inseparable element of 
this business and that the loss in issue is therefore deductible as being “incurred in 
the production of income”.
5The cases discussed above dealt mainly with misappropriations by employees. The 
position is different in relation to proprietors, including sole traders, partnerships, 
members of close corporations and shareholders. A man cannot steal from himself, 
so there is no question of deducting the loss as a result of the theft by a sole proprietor 
from his own business. A partnership is not a legal entity. Under section 24H of the 
Income Tax Act, each partner is taxed on his portion of the income of the partnership 
business and is entitled to deduct his portion of the deductions or allowances related 
to that income. The partner misappropriating the assets would therefore not be able 
to deduct his share of the loss. He would instead be taxed on the amounts he had 
misappropriated as such amount, in effect, would be part of the partner’s profit share.85 
The same principle would apply to members of a close corporation or a shareholder, 
for example, in a private company.
6The deduction of misappropriated funds by senior employees appears to be related 
more to the taxpayer being able to discharge the onus of proof that the risk of the loss 
is inseparable from, or a necessary incident of, the incomeproducing operations of the 
business rather than the seniority of the employee. The more senior the employee, 
for example, a manager or a director, implies that the taxpayer has a heavier onus 
to establish the link between the risk of loss and the ordinary operations of the 
business. It is submitted that the risk of loss from theft from an employee, even a 
senior employee, is not too “remote” (see Warner Lambert86) for such losses to be 
deductible as being incurred “in the production of the income”.
82 Supra at 235.
83 (1975) 37 SATC 306.
84 (1978) 46 SATC 90.
85 ITC 952, (1961) 24 SATC 547 and ITC 1661, (1998) 61 SATC 353.
86 2003 (5) SA 344 (SCA), 65 SATC 346 at 349.
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The Constitution and the “purposive” approach to interpreting fi s-
cal statutes
1Neither the Warner Lambert87 nor the Mobile Telephone Network88 judgements 
referred to section 39(2) of the Constitution89 with regard to how statutes, including 
fiscal statutes, must be interpreted. It is submitted that there was no necessity to 
do so since generally, if the interpretation of a statute follows an approach that will 
promote the democratic values enshrined in the Constitution, such as fairness and 
equity, such interpretation will survive a constitutional challenge (Davis90 and Du 
Plessis & De Ville.91 See also Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another92). The 
approach followed by the judges in those two cases was both fair and equitable to 
taxpayers and therefore there are no constitutional issues at stake.
Conclusion
1It is submitted that this article makes a contribution to the field of taxation in two 
ways:
• A pedagogical contribution to the teaching and learning of tax principles by telling 
the story behind the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case by placing the case and 
even subsequent cases in their historical and social context, which results in a 
more accessible and interesting journey of discovery for the tax scholar.
• Reanalysing the tax principles as enunciated by Watermeyer AJP in the Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramway case in regard to his interpretation of the phrase “in 
the production of the income”. The reanalysis of the principles was done with 
reference to other relevant and subsequently decided cases in order to establish 
whether the rather narrow and restrictive interpretation and meaning attributed 
to that phrase by Watermeyer AJP is still religiously adhered to today or whether 
the meaning of the phrase has been subtly changed and expanded by the judiciary 
over time to meet the dictates of how trade and business is presently conducted.
1It is submitted that from the re-analysis of the interpretation of the phrase that the 
claim by Kruger, et al93 that the “close connection” test as laid down by Watermeyer 
87 Supra.
88 [2014] ZASCA 4.
89 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
90 Davis, D. Democracy–Its Infl uence upon the Process of Constitutional Interpretation, (1994) 10 SAJHR 103
91 Du Plessis & De Ville, Bill of Rights Interpretation in the South African Context, (1993) 4 Stell LR 63. 
92 1996(5) BCLR 658(CC) at page 722.
93 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
93 
AJP for the interpretation of the phrase is too ‘mechanical and contrived”, is 
supported. In fact, when the test has been applied in practice, it has led to some 
absurd results with even more absurd reasons being given by the judiciary to justify 
why an expense is not incurred “in the production of the income”. The cases of COT 
v Rendle94 (theft case) and ITC 105895 (trailer case) are two cases that immediately 
spring to mind. But this absurdity began with the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
case itself when Watermeyer AJP allowed the deduction for the compensation paid 
but disallowed a deduction for the legal expenses directly related to resisting the 
claim as not being incurred “in the production of the income”.
2Kruger, et al96 suggest that instead of using Watermeyer AJP’s interpretation of 
the phrase, Mason J’s interpretation of that phrase in the Lockie Bros97 case, namely, 
that the expenditure must be “actually incurred in the course of and by reason of the 
ordinary operations undertaken for the purpose of conducting the business”, should 
be used. However, it is submitted that even the use of that interpretation is fraught 
with difficulties if one takes into account the facts of the case. That case itself, it is 
suggested, also led to an absurd result in that Mason J held that losses incurred as a 
result of theft or embezzlement of money by an employee may be deductible if the 
employee is a junior employee, but may not be deductible if the employee was a senior 
manager. It is thus submitted that even the adoption of Mason J’s interpretation 
when considered in the light of the facts of the case would not have widened the 
interpretation of the phrase much further.
3The contention by Kruger, et al98 that the interpretation by Watermeyer AJP 
never really recovered from its rocky start has, it is submitted, been superseded by 
two comparatively recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal. In the Warner 
Lambert99 case, the judge used a type of “remoteness” test to establish the “close 
connection” between expenditure incurred and the production of income. He found 
that the social responsibility expenditure incurred by the taxpayer at the behest of 
its holding company was incurred “in the production of the income”. In the second 
instance, the judge in the Mobile Telephone Networks100 case appears to have gone 
even further in finding that the incurral of audit fees by a taxpayer are incurred “in 
the production of the income” and are thus deductible.
4It is submitted that both these decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal have 
considerably widened the meaning to be attributed to the phrase “in the production 
 94 1965(1) SA 59 (SRAD), 26 SATC 326.
 95 (1963) 26 SATC 305.
 96 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
 97 (1922) 32 SATC 150 at 152.
 98 Kruger, D, Stein, M, Dachs, P & Davey, T. 2012. Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition. Durban: LexisNexis at 252.
 99 2003 (5) SA 344 (SCA), 65 SATC 346 at 349.
100 [2014] ZASCA 4.
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of the income” and they have opened the door for a taxpayer to claim expenditure 
incurred as a deduction that was previously unthinkable before these decisions. 
These decisions can be regarded as victories for taxpayers and are in line with our 
constitutional principles of fairness and equity.
5The judiciary has, it is submitted, at last broken the shackles of Watermeyer AJP’s 
narrow and restrictive interpretation of the phrase “in the production of the income” 
and has come to terms with and aligned the interpretation of the phrase to take into 
account the realities, inter alia, economic, social, statutory and other requirements, of 
doing business in the 21st century. Perhaps the old Latin adage tempora mutantur et 
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